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THE UTILITY OF PREDICTING 
DANGEROUSNESS IN THE WAR ON TERROR 
CATHERINE R. L. LAWSON* 
INTRODUCTION 
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, questions 
surrounding the use of power in many contexts confronted the United 
States in the new context of a War on Terror. These fresh inquiries centered 
primarily on the definitions and distinctions between “war” and armed 
conflict, the treatment of prisoners captured in the course of hostilities 
abroad, and the murky outer limits of executive authority in this new 
historical context. Nowhere did these pressing questions emerge more 
explicitly than in the cases brought by detainees held in Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba. 
The line of habeas corpus cases emerging from Guantanamo has 
trended towards a gradual expansion of the habeas doctrine, a doctrine still 
not fully developed in its application to non-state actors suspected or 
convicted of terrorism. From Rasul to Boumediene, the Supreme Court has 
progressively clarified that the writ of habeas does indeed apply to certain 
foreign individuals in some international contexts.1 However, as the 
preceding qualifying language suggests, the way in which the writ 
manifests on behalf of those individuals remains a murkier question. Since 
Boumediene, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has 
been the principal court to address this question, as the circuit charged with 
maintaining jurisdiction over the Guantanamo habeas appeals. 
In its attempts to formulate an appropriate habeas process that both 
respects the government’s interests in both security and secrecy while also 
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 1.  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480 (2004) 
(“Whatever traction the presumption against extraterritoriality might have in other contexts, it certainly 
has no application to the operation of the habeas statute with respect to persons detained within the 
‘territorial jurisdiction’ of the United States.”) (citing Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 
(1949)). 
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guarding the rights of detained individuals against excessive executive 
force, the D.C. Circuit has explored numerous procedural and substantive 
issues in the new light of international terrorism. Paradigmatically, the 
overarching struggle has remained whether and to what extent traditional 
notions of domestic criminal law and the international law of war should 
apply in the terrorism context. Scholars and political analysts have eagerly 
added their own opinions on the matter, opinions that run the spectrum 
from advocating for exclusively domestic criminal prosecutions2 to a 
wholesale adoption of the law of war framework,3 with others 
recommending the establishment of a new judicial branch to handle this 
class of cases.4 
In this Note, I will draw on this broad debate to consider a narrower 
inquiry left underutilized in some D.C. Circuit opinions: future 
dangerousness. In its most basic form, the future dangerousness inquiry 
requires executive agents to make an evidentiary showing of individual-
specific harmful conduct, or risk of harmful conduct, to the community 
such that a tribunal deems continued detention necessary to ensure the 
safety of the community. This inquiry could serve as a useful substantive 
approach to bridge some of the concerns between the domestic law 
advocates and the international law advocates; though, I also argue that the 
domestic criminal law version of the dangerousness inquiry is better suited 
to these cases. This individual-specific approach also better comports with 
our nation’s historic values than the current approach used by the D.C. 
Court of Appeals. 
To this end, Part I gives an abbreviated overview of the current debate 
surrounding Guantanamo detainees, laying out the relevant interests and 
principles that are at stake. Part II briefly outlines Boumediene and some 
relevant D.C. Circuit opinions. Part III then considers how the 
dangerousness inquiry in the terrorism context might play out, and why the 
domestic version of that inquiry is suited to the present context. 
 
 2.  E.g., David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism, 38 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2003). 
 3.  E.g., Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Replies to Congressional Authorization: International 
Law, U.S. War Powers, and the Global War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2653 (2005); see also 
Derek Jinks, September 11 and the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Jinks, 
September 11]. 
 4.  Andrew C. McCarthy & Alykhan Velshi, Outsourcing American Law: We Need a National 
Security Court (Am. Enter. Inst. for Pub. Policy Research No. 156, 2006), available at http://www.aei. 
org/files/2009/08/20/20090820-Chapter6.pdf; see also Jack L. Goldsmith & Neal Katyal, Op.-Ed., The 
Terrorists’ Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2007, at A19 (arguing for “a comprehensive system of 
preventive detention that would supplement the criminal process [and] would have greater legitimacy 
than our current patchwork system”); Jinks, September 11, supra note 3. 
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I. THE OVERARCHING INTERESTS AND FRAMEWORKS 
The many debates surrounding the legal intricacies of the War on 
Terror are far too varied and nuanced for an in-depth survey in this Note. 
However, there is a more limited set of interests and principles that tend to 
propel the discussion in its many forms, and they are similarly present here. 
The overarching balancing inquiry is between the government’s authority 
to detain, without trial, individuals it considers dangerous for national 
security purposes and an individual’s interest in maintaining his personal 
liberty and autonomy (particularly if the individual is innocent of any 
wrongdoing). There remains the question of what legal framework best 
reconciles those interests in the terrorism context, acts of which have 
historically been dealt with as crimes, but which after September 11 have 
taken on a dimension more akin to acts of war. 
The fact that the contested terrorism cases deal with preventive 
detention adds another layer of complexity. If the government’s evidence 
establishes that a detainee committed war crimes or committed terrorist 
acts, it would be a familiar context both for the law of war and for general 
criminal law. Those frameworks would use detainment in its most 
commonly accepted role: punishment as condemnation of socially 
undesirable actions.5 However, when the government’s knowledge is not 
fully developed, when it cannot satisfy a standard of beyond a reasonable 
doubt, detention morphs into something quite different. Instead of a tool for 
punishment, detention primarily becomes a means for prevention of future 
harm. It is based on the government’s belief that it has or will have enough 
information about the detainee to warrant concern about some future act of 
war or criminal undertaking, and the risk that that act might come to pass is 
simply too great to justify freeing the individual.6 Therefore, the suspect is 
simply detained for what might become an indefinite period of time.7 Both 
the law of war and criminal law have developed frameworks of preventive 
detention, though neither wholly fit the current paradigm, which factually 
lives halfway between both worlds. 
 
 5.  See Christopher Slobogin, The Civilization of the Criminal Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 121, 129 
(2005). 
 6.  See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 749 (1987) (“The government’s interest in 
preventing crime by arrestees is both legitimate and compelling.”). But see generally Paul H. Robinson, 
Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
1429 (2001) (discussing the dangers of a prevention-based criminal system). 
 7.  See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (noting the possibility of indefinite 
detention in a non-traditional conflict). 
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Deprivations of liberty by the government have long been accepted 
under international law as a normal incident of war.8 However, this 
allowance has not diminished the belief that such detention constitutes an 
extraordinary act of government power.9 The exertion of this extraordinary 
power, particularly in a democratic republic like the United States, usually 
relies on justifications unique to the context of war. The foremost 
justification is, of course, that the government has a duty to defend its 
people, and when that duty is in play, government power broadens 
significantly.10 This line of reasoning has assumed particular importance in 
how U.S. courts have applied the laws of war. In one such case, Johnson v. 
Eisentrager, the U.S. Supreme Court found that German operatives 
captured abroad during World War II did not have access to habeas, the 
Supreme Court emphasizing the fact that the prisoners had actively worked 
against U.S. interests during the War.11 Similarly, in Ex parte Quirin, 
addressing German saboteurs caught on U.S. soil, the Court again noted 
that times of war and national emergency create a different social and legal 
context than that of everyday life.12 
However, there are limiting principles on this justification that 
traditionally circumscribe the exercise of government’s heightened wartime 
powers. Namely, the traditional view was that enemy soldiers wear 
uniforms, making identification easy, that such soldiers have representative 
states that can negotiate through diplomatic channels for their fair treatment 
and eventual return, and that there is a definable and often definitive end-
 
 8.  Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518 (“[D]etention of individuals falling into the limited category [of 
enemy combatants], for the duration of the particular conflict in which they were captured, is [a] 
fundamental and accepted . . . incident to war . . . .”). 
 9.  In its brief in Hamdi, the government made a concerted effort to present the issue of 
detainment as one potentially circumscribed to the context of war. See Brief for the Respondents at 14, 
Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (No. 03-6696), 2004 WL 724020, at *14 (noting that “the President’s war powers 
include the authority to capture and detain enemy combatants in wartime, at least for the duration of a 
conflict”). But see Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 552 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and 
concurring in the judgment) (noting the “inadequacy” of the government’s argument on this front). 
 10.  See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (holding that there 
are “necessary concomitants of nationality” in the international context that authorize executive 
authority). But see Salerno, 481 U.S. at 766 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Grave public danger is said to 
result from what [the defendants] may be expected to do, in addition to what they have done since their 
conviction. If I assume that defendants are disposed to commit every opportune disloyal act helpful to 
Communist countries, it is still difficult to reconcile with traditional American law the jailing of persons 
by the courts because of anticipated but as yet uncommitted crimes. Imprisonment to protect society 
from predicted but unconsummated offenses is . . . unprecedented in this country and . . . fraught with 
danger of excesses and injustice . . . .” (ellipses in original) (quoting Williamson v. United States, 184 
F.2d 280, 282 (2d Cir. 1950)). 
 11.  Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
 12.  Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1942). 
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point to a state of active war marked by surrender.13 The presence of such 
criteria has been a mainstay of discussion and debate surrounding military 
authority in a time of war, serving as the countervailing interests against an 
otherwise unchecked national security interest. In essence, those traditional 
realities affirmed a measure of confidence that even if violations occur, 
their impact will be minimal. 
There are two problems with applying the law of war framework to 
current U.S. operations. First, from a strictly formalist viewpoint, the U.S. 
is not in a state of congressionally declared war. Though some scholars are 
considerably troubled by this omission,14 particularly since the U.S. has not 
been in a formal state of declared war since World War II,15 the lack of a 
formal declaration is primarily a domestic constitutional issue, and does not 
alone trigger a distinct outcome under the international legal framework. 
Instead, that broader legal regime is more powerfully affected by the 
absence of those ameliorative criteria discussed above. Members of 
terrorist groups do not wear uniforms, do not have a nation-state to 
advocate for them, and the end of the War on Terror may eventually prove 
as ephemeral as that of the War on Drugs. As such, the potential for abuse 
and violations is much higher in some regards than in a typical war.16 In 
particular, the temporal ambiguity of the conflict creates the possibility of a 
permanent ratchet of executive authority, something that goes against the 
understanding that war powers are extraordinary, and ought to be 
temporary.17 
In the domestic criminal context, executive detention becomes a very 
different matter from its wartime counterpart. Any attempt to detain an 
individual must meet strict constitutional requirements, both procedural and 
substantive. Domestically, detainment is almost exclusively the province of 
the criminal process, with occasional forays by the civil system as well.18 
 
 13.  Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on 
Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2124 (2005). 
 14.  E.g., Bruce Ackerman, This Is Not a War, 113 YALE L.J. 1871 (2004). 
 15.  See RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32170, INSTANCES OF USE OF 
UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES ABROAD, 1798-2006, at 15-39 (2007) (reporting no formal 
declarations of war by the United States after World War II). 
 16.  Robert Chesney & Jack L. Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and 
Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1100 (2008). 
 17.  After all, the position of Caesar in ancient Rome was originally temporary, exemplified by 
Lucius Cincinnatus, who was dictator of Rome for sixteen days (long enough to save it from invasion) 
and then voluntarily gave up his power. 1 TITUS LIVIUS (LIVY), THE HISTORY OF ROME 170-73 (Ernest 
Rhys ed., Canon Roberts trans., E.P. Dutton & Co. 1912) (c. 25 B.C.E.). 
 18.  David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War, 97 
CAL. L. REV. 693, 697 (2009) (referencing the civil commitment of mentally disabled persons, 
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The executive branch does not enjoy broad deference from the courts in 
this setting; instead, its reach is strictly circumscribed and judicial review 
of detention is high, both ex post (through the many doctrines governing 
prosecutions)19 and ex ante (through the appellate process and habeas 
corpus review).20 This is particularly true with preventive detention. The 
contexts in which the executive is allowed to preventively detain an 
individual are severely limited and are contingent on either a future or past 
trial in the criminal context.21 Situations where the government may 
preventively detain someone include holding a material witness for future 
testimony,22 detaining an accused individual who is deemed either a flight 
risk or danger to the community in the face of an upcoming trial,23 and 
continuing to keep convicted sex offenders past their sentences upon a 
showing that they are still dangerous to the community.24 In each of these 
situations, the government must make some kind of showing to a judge and 
receive a favorable ruling before the preventive detention is allowed. 
But the majority of the detainees at Guantanamo have not been 
prosecuted under the available federal or state criminal statutes.25 The 
nature of the terrorist organization—internationally based, bent on 
widespread destruction of entire societies—separates organizations like al 
Qaeda from the individuals and groups previously prosecuted under 
domestic statutes, and in response, both the current and previous 
presidential administrations have sought far-reaching detainment power.26 
Without the promise of a future trial, the criminal law’s framework for 
preventive detainment offers only limited guidance as to how courts should 
move forward. Additionally, there has been strong push-back by both 
scholars and judges, in addition to government lawyers, against an 
importation of domestic criminal law principles into the Guantanamo cases. 
The objections center primarily on two propositions: first, that if any 
 
immigration detentions for persons who are flight risks, and quarantines as examples of civil preventive 
detention). 
 19.  E.g., U.S. CONST., amend. IV; FED. R. CRIM. P.; FED. R. CIV. P.  
 20.  JUDITH FARBEY, R.J. SHARPE, WITH SIMON ATRILL, THE LAW OF HABEAS CORPUS, 1, 21-23 
(3d ed. 2011). 
 21.  Cole, supra note 18, at 700. 
 22.  18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2006). 
 23.  FED. R. CRIM. PRO. 32.1(a)(6). 
 24.  See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 369 (1997) (holding that post-conviction civil 
commitment of sex offenders does not violate the double jeopardy clause). 
 25.  The Guantanamo Docket, NEW YORK TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo (last 
updated Feb. 15, 2012) (showing that of the 779 detainees who have been held at Guantanamo, 600 
have been transferred to other countries). But see U.S. v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D.Va. 
2003) (cert denied 125 S.Ct. 1670, Mar. 21, 2005). 
 26.  See Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009). 
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criminal law were imported, all of its procedures and doctrines would have 
to be carried over as well; and second, that the need to follow the 
accompanying evidentiary and procedural rules that mark domestic 
criminal cases would overly encumber government action charged with 
safeguarding national security. There is also an accompanying concern that 
the necessary relaxing of the criminal doctrines for terrorism cases would 
infect domestic cases as well, leading to an overall degeneration of 
domestic protections.27 
Though there are strong government interests in preventive detention 
and sources of authority in both contexts—police power for criminal law 
and war powers for law of war—the countervailing interest in each 
situation is also particularly strong: personal liberty. In the United States, 
individual liberty from government interference and control unchecked by 
the restraints of due process remains an overriding concern of its 
Constitution and its people.28 This is particularly true when the risks 
associated with erroneous detention are high, both in terms of the difficulty 
of correctly identifying an enemy who does not wear uniforms, and the 
devastating costs to the detainee in terms of potentially years of freedom 
lost. The question of whether a foreign national’s personal liberty interest 
warrants rigorous review of the causes justifying his incarceration when 
detained on U.S. soil was resolved in the affirmative by Boumediene, 
discussed below. The ongoing question that the courts now face is where to 
strike the balance between the historic interests of freedom and security 
without a neatly applicable framework. I do not propose to resolve this 
debate here, but merely to support a doctrine I think has been erroneously 
excluded from the discussion. 
II. SOME CASE HISTORY 
Before discussing dangerousness, it is valuable to examine some of 
the case history of habeas review for aliens detained abroad. Boumediene v. 
Bush addressed the status of several foreign nationals “designated as enemy 
combatants and detained” at Guantanamo Bay.29 The detainees had been 
held without formal charges and argued that they possessed a right to 
habeas corpus under the Constitution, a right not voided by their 
 
 27.  See John Farmer, Op-Ed, A Terror Threat in the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan 13, 2008, at A; see 
also Jack L. Goldsmith & Neal Katyal, Op-Ed, The Terrorists’ Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2007, at 
A19; Michael B. Mukasey, Op-Ed, Jose Padilla Makes Bad Law, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 2007. 
 28.  Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (saying that substantive due process stands to 
protect right “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” from government interference). 
 29.  128 S.Ct. 2229, 2240 (2008). 
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designation as enemy combatants.30 The Court agreed, holding that the 
government must provide sufficient evidence to justify continued 
detainment.31 
In so deciding, the Court extended habeas review to individuals 
detained by the U.S. government on de facto U.S. territory, including 
Guantanamo.32 However, the Court did not describe what habeas review for 
detainees entailed; it simply held that the review proceedings were 
inadequate as compared to the proceedings seen in previous cases.33 
Principally, the Court looked to Eisentrager, discussed earlier, noting that 
the Guantanamo processes did not have a comparable “rigorous adversarial 
process,” falling “well short of the procedures and adversarial mechanisms 
that would eliminate the need for habeas corpus review.”34 However, the 
Court did not describe what mechanisms would sufficiently meet the 
requirements of habeas in the present context, leaving either the lower 
courts or Congress the responsibility of deciding the ultimate manifestation 
of judicial review for these cases.35 
Congress has not acted to redefine habeas proceedings since 
Boumediene, so the various courts of the D.C. circuit have labored to erect 
some framework of analysis absent legislative guidance. Since 2008, the 
district courts have issued thirty-eight opinions on the issue, and the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals has issued eleven decisions on appeal dealing 
with the issue.36 These cases scrutinize government action under the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force (hereinafter referred to as AUMF), 
passed soon after the attacks of September 11. The relevant text of the 
AUMF authorizes the president to “use all necessary and appropriate force 
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, 
authorized, committed, or aided” those attacks in order “to prevent any 
future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such 
 
 30.  Id. at 2277. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. at 2262. 
 33.  Id. at 2259-60.  
 34.  Id. at 2260 (The German operatives “were charged by a bill of particulars that made detailed 
factual allegations against them…were entitled to representation by counsel, allowed to introduce 
evidence on their own behalf, and permitted to cross-examine the prosecution’s witnesses.”). 
 35.  See Chisun Lee, Op-Ed., Their Own Private Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2009, at A31 
(discussing the disparate standards reached by courts for the government’s detention authority and 
urging Congress’ and the President’s involvement to ensure consistency). 
 36.  Ben Wittes, Robert M. Chesney & Larkin Reynolds, The Emerging Law of Detention 2.0: The 
Guantanamo Habeas Cases as Lawmaking, in THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 2 (2011), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2011/05_guantanamo_wittes/05_guantanamo_wittes
.pdf. 
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nations, organizations or persons.”37 The AUMF does not contain a sunset 
provision, leaving no temporal cutoff for presidential action under its 
authority absent revocation by Congress. This raises questions about how 
long a person may be permissibly detained in furtherance of the broader 
goal of stamping out sources of terrorism, and what law should be applied 
in fleshing out the application of the AUMF more than a decade after its 
enactment, and after a series of Supreme Court decisions.38 
This search for an applicable background framework was evident in Al 
Bihani v. Obama.  There the government alleged that Al Bihani was 
affiliated with and militarily trained by al Qaeda, and supported the Taliban 
in a skirmish with U.S. military forces in Afghanistan.39 Al Bihani 
countered that he was merely a cook, and denied that he had ever received 
military training or even pursued a relationship with al Qaeda.40 Judge 
Leon found that Al Bihani’s ties with al Qaeda were sufficient to establish 
membership within the organization and that serving as a cook was an act 
of support, enabling the government to satisfy habeas review.41 On review, 
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals panel had a different idea. Judges Brown 
and Kavanaugh wrote explicitly that the international laws of war were 
irrelevant to the question of appropriate detention under the AUMF.42 
Instead, they reasoned that domestic law sources alone provided the 
appropriate tools for the court, and applied the Military Commissions Act 
of 2006 and its 2009 successor (collectively hereinafter referred to as 
MCA).43 However, what might have been a settled issue became quickly 
unsettled. Al Bihani petitioned for en banc review; though it denied review, 
a majority of the en banc court stated that the panel’s rejection of 
international law was dicta,44 and a later case explicitly relied on 
international law.45 At the end of this very public discussion in the D.C. 
Circuit, there still remains “the lingering disagreement regarding which 
bodies of law actually govern” the issues surrounding detention.46 
 
 37.  Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
 38.  Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on 
Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2123-24 (2005); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 
(2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
 39.  Al Bihani v. Obama, 594 F. Supp. 2d 35, 38 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. at 39. 
 42.  Al Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 871-72 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Judge Williams joined in the 
judgment but questioned this idea of the majority). 
 43. Id. at 872-73. 
 44.  Al Bihani v Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (denial of petition for rehearing en banc). 
 45.  See Al Warafi v. Obama, No. 10-5170, 2011 WL 678437 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 22, 2011). 
 46.  Chesney & Reynolds, supra note 36, at 34. 
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In another case decided the same year as Al Bihani, the court in Awad 
v. Obama similarly followed the membership model for analyzing the 
government’s justification for detention, finding evidence that the detainee 
was “part of al Qaeda in December of 2001.”47 Though the government 
provided a significant amount of evidence regarding Awad’s alleged 
personal actions,48 the court repeatedly emphasized the membership 
analysis used in Al Bihani.49 These decisions are consistent with earlier 
terrorism cases in the circuit that held that the AUMF, consistent with 
international law, authorized detention based on membership.50 What this 
has also meant is that individuals found to be supporting al Qaeda, but not 
actual members of the organization, do not fall within the scope of the 
AUMF under international law.51 
III. FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS 
A. International and Domestic Frameworks 
The legal framework apparently adopted by the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals is described as a “membership-based” method of analysis for 
detention. As discussed above, this is the model favored by the 
international legal framework. The simplest distinction between the 
artificially binary approaches to detention employed by international law 
and criminal law is that the former employs status-based determinations 
and the latter employs conduct-based determinations. Justification for 
detention under international law is primarily based on the group 
membership, or status, of an individual.52 U.S. criminal law, however, 
focuses on the individual’s conduct. Even when Judges Brown and 
Kavanaugh looked to the MCA for guidance,53 they still employed a 
primarily international law perspective, because the MCA also bases its 
determinations on membership, most likely reflecting a desire to frame 
government action taken under the MCA as war. 
 
 47.  Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 48.  Id. at 4-5. 
 49.  See, e.g., id. at 1. 
 50.  See Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 55 (D.D.C. 2009); Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. 
Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 51.  Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 63. 
 52.  Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 1084-85. 
 53.  As a side note, the MCA does not provide a framework for legal analysis, merely a possible 
definition for individuals subject to detention. It simply states that military commissions may proceed 
against aliens who are members of AUMF-covered groups and those who provide support to those 
groups. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 3, 120 Stat. 2600, 2601-02 (codified 
as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a(1), 948c); Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 
18-2, 123 Stat. 2190, 2575-76 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a, 948b(a)).  
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International law considers detention primarily as an exercise of state 
power against a known enemy. The Geneva Conventions generally govern 
the rights and privileges surrounding detention incident to international 
war.54 The relevant international law in the Guantanamo cases is Common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Convention—which regulates conflicts between a 
state and non-state actor—and Additional Protocol II, which also applies to 
non-international conflicts.55 The difficulty in applying these sources of law 
is that neither Common Article 3 nor Additional Protocol II discusses the 
detention of prisoners. While Common Article 2 “exhaustively regulates” 
detentions and incorporates the entirety of the Geneva Convention,56 
Common Article 2 applies to conflicts between two nation-states, a context 
dissimilar to the War on Terror. This leaves the courts with the job of 
attempting to analogize Common Article 2, a non-applicable agreement, to 
Guantanamo detentions, or of supplementing in Common Article 3 and 
Additional Protocol II with general principles of international law. The 
D.C. Circuit courts do not seem opposed to these analytical processes, as 
they have twice indicated that international law encompasses both conflicts 
between two nation-states and asymmetric conflicts between one nation-
state and a non-state actor.57 
Looking to broad principles under the Geneva Convention, 
“membership in a specific group is a necessary condition for POW status in 
five out of six scenarios, and for the most part, it is a sufficient condition as 
well. Associational status in that sense is the primary triggering condition 
for military detention during international armed conflict.”58 Since most of 
international law up to this point has dealt with the interactions of nation-
states,59 the background understanding of the membership-framework 
largely depends on the existence of uniforms, an outmoded requirement 
 
 54.  See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 641-42 (2006). 
 55.  Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 118, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts, adopted June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
Non-International Armed Conflicts, adopted June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional 
Protocol II]. 
 56.  David Mortlock, Definite Detention: The Scope of the President’s Authority to Detain Enemy 
Combatants, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 381 (2010). 
 57.  Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 59 (D.D.C. 2011); Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 
2d, 63, 73 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 58.  Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 1084-85.  
 59.  See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060 
(1945) (describing the accepted sources of international law, all of which come from sovereign nations 
in some way). 
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imported into the terrorism context at the great expense of descriptive 
accuracy. 
Both the Bush and Obama administrations have clearly expressed their 
belief that the appropriate source-material for detention inquiries lies in 
international law doctrine. “The [Obama] Administration has stated that, 
whether or not the various international agreements bind the United States, 
‘[p]rinciples derived from law-of-war rules governing international armed 
conflicts’ must inform any determination of detention under the AUMF.”60 
This understanding is echoed by several district courts and scholars.61 
However, the traditional law of war framework is inextricably linked with 
an unwillingness to place a high burden of proof on the government’s 
ability to detain suspected terrorists. 
 
The military model is the least demanding, traditionally requiring a 
showing of mere group membership in the enemy armed forces and 
providing alleged detainees with relatively trivial procedural protections. 
At the other extreme, the civilian criminal model is the most demanding, 
tending to require a showing of specific criminal conduct and providing 
defendants with a panoply of rights designed to reduce the risk of 
erroneous convictions.62 
 
Yet concern about over-burdening the government should not 
foreclose an inquiry into whether criminal law might in fact prove a more 
workable framework for habeas review. While international detention 
analysis relies on notions of sovereignty and state actor reciprocity, 
criminal law detention finds its primary justification in the government’s 
exercise of police power.63 Moreover, the international law on these issues 
can be very opaque, leading to uncertainty in the judicial process.64 
Contrary to the international law’s membership model for detention, 
“[i]n the American legal tradition, criminal sanctions typically attach to 
one’s conduct and not one’s status or associations.”65 A future 
 
 60.  Mortlock, supra note 55, at 380-81. 
 61.  E.g., Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 70-71; Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 13, at 2091; 
Goodman & Jinks, supra note 3, at 2654-56. 
 62.  Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 1081. 
 63.  See generally Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1 
(2003). 
 64.  See Al Warafi v. Obama, No. 10-5170, 2011 WL 678437 (D.C. Cir. Feb 22, 2011) (circuit 
remanded for further fact finding relating to parts of the Geneva Convention about detention of medical 
personnel). 
 65.  Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 1082. But see Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) 
Statute, 21 U.S.C. § 848 (2006); Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2006). 
LAWSON EIC4 MACRO - TO PO(DO NOT DELETE) 5/21/2012  8:56 PM 
2012] THE UTILITY OF PREDICTING DANGEROUSNESS IN THE WAR ON TERROR 419 
dangerousness review in criminal law looks to past conduct (alleged or 
otherwise) rather than status to determine whether an individual poses a 
future risk of harmful or obstructing conduct—uncontrollable violent or 
sexual behavior, a flight risk, etc.66 In particular, the non-punitive models 
of criminal detentions are the best analogue to military detention; military 
detention is about preventing harm, not condemnation of individual actors, 
while criminal detention most frequently is meant to punish.67 
Dangerousness determinations frequently occur in the course of non-
punitive detention hearings.68 Preventive detentions that have been upheld 
generally share three commonalities: a non-punitive nature, temporal 
limitation, and an individual-specific justification.69 Non-punitive detention 
generally arises in three relevant domestic contexts: pre-trial detention, 
continued imprisonment for some mentally ill persons, and continued 
imprisonment for certain sex offenders. The dangerousness inquiry 
emphasizes the past conduct of an individual, and requires the government 
to meet a certain evidentiary bar before it can proceed. Though this can be 
a difficult task—predicting human behavior usually is—it is one the 
Supreme Court has found to be commonplace in American jurisprudence.70 
In many cases, the bar is that of clear and convincing proof, a lower 
standard that that required in a normal trial resulting in punitive detention.71 
 
 66.  However, the future dangerousness inquiry is not without controversy, see, e.g., Paul H. 
Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention As Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. 
L. REV. 1429, 1432 (2001); see also Meghan Shapiro, An Overdose of Dangerousness: How "Future 
Dangerousness" Catches the Least Culpable Capital Defendants and Undermines the Rationale for the 
Executions It Supports, 35 AM. J. CRIM. L. 145, 200 (2008) (discussing the moral and evidentiary 
challenges to using future dangerousness in capital punishment cases). 
 67.  Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 1082. 
 68.  For a more complete look at the Supreme Court doctrine of future dangerousness, see Kansas 
v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (civil commitment of mentally ill sex offenders); United States v. 
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (pretrial detention of dangerous adults); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 
(1984) (pretrial detention of dangerous juveniles); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (civil 
commitment of mentally ill); Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695 (1949) (courts martial of American 
soldiers). For a description of the contexts in which dangerousness determinations play a role in the 
criminal process, see Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness as a Criterion in the Criminal Process, in 
LAW, MENTAL HEALTH & MENTAL DISORDER 360-63 (Bruce Sales & Daniel Shuman eds., 1996). 
 69.  See Cole, supra note 18, at 708.  
 70.  Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274-76 (1976) (“Prediction of future criminal conduct is an 
essential element in many of the decisions rendered throughout our criminal justice system . . . [that 
task] is thus basically no different from the task performed countless times each day throughout the 
American system of criminal justice.”). 
 71.  E.g., Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (upholding preventive detention pending trial under a “clear and 
convincing” standard). However, the district courts of the District of Columbia and the D.C. Court of 
Appeals have been using a preponderance of the evidence standard in all of their evidentiary rulings 
against the government. Chesney & Reynolds, supra note 36, at 34, 12.  
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These sources may aid in providing a standard for reviewing the 
potential future dangerousness of detainees and weighing the executive’s 
arguments for continued imprisonment. Moreover, this application would 
not be wholly foreign to the area of terrorism, which has historically been 
categorized as criminal acts as well as acts of war.72 
B. The Potential Benefits of a Conduct-Based Dangerousness Inquiry 
The future dangerousness inquiry as it manifests in the domestic 
context may prove more beneficial as a basis for detention vis-á-vis the 
status-based alternative, primarily because it requires a particularized 
showing of potential harm, a requirement comporting well with—and even 
emerging from—the values of accountability and procedural checks 
otherwise embraced in the American system. Such a showing need not 
necessitate that the government produce the full weight of its evidence––it 
certainly does not in the preliminary hearing context in federal domestic 
cases73––but such a requirement would constitute a burden higher than the 
government’s mere assertions that unproven proximity or association 
necessitate detention. It is almost like having a good faith requirement for 
government action. Particularized evidence facilitates an individual-
specific determination by the tribunal, placing courts in a better position to 
discharge their vital role as a neutral check on an executive whose 
overwhelming responsibility to ensure our national security may lead to 
over-detention. 
This restraint on the executive is particularly important in the 
terrorism context. The individuals who are accused of terrorist activity do 
not have a state that will defend their interests or work to provide 
countervailing evidence on their behalf. Without that external backing, 
countervailing checks furnished by U.S. judicial processes, including 
access to counsel and judicial review, stands as the only systemic bulwark 
against potentially improper executive detention. 
It may be that the majority of the detainees are indeed guilty, and 
perhaps still more would be justifiably detained pending a final judgment 
as to either guilt or innocence. We should hope that our intelligence 
agencies are that accurate. But “[c]onstitutional safeguards for the 
protection of all who are charged with offenses are not to be disregarded in 
order to inflict merited punishment on some who are guilty.”74 Nothing 
 
 72.  John P. McLoughlin, Gregory P. Noone & Diana C. Noone, Security Detention, Terrorism, 
and the Prevention Imperative, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 463, 467-69 (2009). 
 73.  See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 751 (upholding preventive detention pending trial under a “clear and 
convincing” standard). 
 74.  Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942). 
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about our history or the structure of the Constitution justifies or requires 
blind trust in the inherent but unproven accuracy of government assertions. 
If habeas is to have any significance in the context of detainees in the 
War on Terror, there must be a meaningful review of the government’s 
detention power. For there to be such a meaningful review, courts must 
actively engage with and scrutinize the evidence proffered by the 
government. This requires evidence to question, and a membership-based 
inquiry functionally cedes the court’s supervisory ability to the executive; 
the evidence for membership offered in many of these cases has focused on 
the fact that the accused was picked up in the same location as other 
suspected terrorists.75 In this way, the courts have been made to determine 
only whether the individual was sufficiently connected to an organization 
the government has labeled dangerous, missing the step of determining the 
individual’s actual dangerousness. 
Circumstantial association may be informative, but it should not stand 
in for an individual’s particular propensity to engage in violent behavior on 
the level of deadly terrorist attacks. It would likely be the case that an 
individual affiliated with a terrorist organization would be considered 
dangerous, and a finding to that effect would certainly cut in favor of 
detention. However, requiring a particularized explanation of what 
individual detainees have done or said in the past, or even while detained, 
should also have a place in the habeas process surrounding the liberty 
interests of the detainees. This is particularly true with habeas review; as an 
inherently reactionary doctrine that gives a responsive power to individuals 
against government detainment, its purpose is to make the government give 
an account of its actions.76 
Requiring this type of particularized showing also does less violence 
to our historic protection of individual autonomy. Though dangerousness 
inquiries are somewhat ephemeral and purport to predict and preempt 
future action, detention on that basis ought to at least arise from the actual 
 
 75.  See Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“Attendance at either an al-
Qaida training camp or an al-Qaida guesthouse ‘would seem to overwhelmingly, if not definitively, 
justify’ detention.” (citing Al Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 873 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2010)); Al Bihani v. 
Obama, 594 F. Supp. 2d 35, 39-40 (D.D.C. 2009) (al Bihani was apprehended in same location as other 
terrorists); Al Alwi v. Bush, 593 F. Supp. 2d 24, 28 (D.D.C. 2008) (“[P] stayed at guesthouses closely 
associated with the Taliban and al Qaeda . . . .”) (decision authorizing government detention affirmed 
by Al Alwi v. Obama, 653 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011)); Gharani v. Bush, 593 F. Supp. 2d 144, 147-48 
(D.D.C. 2009) (holding that the government failed to meet its burden of proof and granting el Gharani’s 
habeas petition despite hearing the government’s argument for detention partially because el Gharani 
“stayed at an al Qaeda-affiliated guesthouse . . . .” ). 
 76.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 646 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) 
(stating that civil rights, of which habeas review is one, “gives a private right that authority shall go no 
farther.”). 
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words and actions of the individual to be detained, respecting his personal 
autonomy (even if the result of that inquiry results in punitive or non-
punitive detention).77 This practice would also conform better to an 
understanding of a government of constitutional restraints, limited 
necessarily and deliberately by the People who give it force.78 In this way, 
requiring the government to hew more closely to the traditional 
expectations surrounding its exercise of detention power supports the rule 
of law.79 
Though it may seem difficult to place such a high priority on the 
processes of law and government justification, particularly with regard to 
those accused of seeking our ultimate demise, our society has looked back 
with great disappointment at instances in which we have failed to give 
adequate weight to our principled view of limited government, even in the 
face of grave threats. As we saw in Korematsu and the McCarthy hearings, 
our country does not live up to its potential when we sacrifice skepticism of 
government power and adherence to constitutional limits for the latitude 
government claims is necessary to ensure national security.80 
I do not believe that the argument in favor of future dangerousness 
inquiries in detainees’ habeas review context necessitate a wholesale 
importation of domestic criminal law process. Just because the general 
framework is used does not require that all of the procedural safeguards 
and substantive rules need to be as stringent or present at all. Even in the 
domestic context, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure suspend the 
normal rules of evidence in some circumstances.81 Indeed, the Supreme 
Court has emphasized that evidentiary rules regarding hearsay do not have 
to apply for there to be adequate habeas review.82 The procedural benefit to 
 
 77.  See Alec D. Walen, Crossing a Moral Line: Long-Term Preventive Detention in the War on 
Terror, 28 PHIL. & PUB. POL’Y Q. 15 (2008). 
 78.  For a broader discussion of the extraterritorial application of the Constitution see generally 
Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitutional After Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 
259 (2009). 
 79.  See Kermit Roosevelt III, Guantanamo and the Conflict of Laws: Rasul and Beyond, 153 U. 
PA. L. REV. 2017, 2018 (2005). 
 80.  Cole, supra note 2, at 3 (“In hindsight, these responses are virtually always considered 
mistakes. They invite excesses and abuses, as many innocents suffer without any evident gain in 
security. And most significantly, they compromise our most basic principles—commitments to equal 
treatment, political freedoms, individualized justice, and the rule of law.”). 
 81.  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1. The advisory committee notes make clear that the rule allows 
preliminary hearings and grand jury investigations to rely on hearsay that would be inadmissible at trial 
for its decision. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1 advisory committee’s note on 1972 adoption. 
 82.  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533-34 (2004) (“[T]he exigencies of the circumstances 
may demand that, aside from these core elements, enemy-combatant proceedings may be tailored to 
alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict. 
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using the dangerousness inquiry is that it is familiar and grounded. It can 
serve as a stabilizing argumentative process in what is a very fluid area of 
law at the moment, and can offer a way to make some of the unknowns of 
dealing with terrorists less mysterious. Since the future dangerous inquiry 
already entails some deference to the executive and a lowered burden of 
proof, it can easily carry over into the terrorism context, paying due respect 
to the national security interests at stake. Even if judges found that it 
needed to be altered and tailored in some way, the future dangerousness 
inquiry would still comprise a nearer fit than the traditional laws of war, 
which do not fit the reality of our current international status. 
CONCLUSION 
Criminal analysis for future dangerousness is based on the known 
conduct of the detainee, from before, during, and after the initial moment of 
detention. This type of focus, if used in Guantanamo habeas proceedings, 
could anchor the analysis of judges faced with these cases. It need not bring 
in the other indicia of criminal analysis, such as a clear and convincing 
burden of proof and evidentiary standards. Instead, it could serve as a 
familiar and helpful guide in a quickly changing world faced with 
circumstances yet unaddressed by international law. 
Though some legal scholarship seems to support an international law 
approach, that support is not as strong as it may seem. Numerous 
arguments in favor of that framework frequently end up looking like a 
conduct-based approach. For example, one discussion of using a laws of 
war methodology argues that determinations of detainees’ dangerousness 
“could be based on, among other things, the detainee’s past conduct, level 
of authority within al Qaeda, statements and actions during confinement, 
age and health, and psychological profile.”83 Those are all factors that 
appear in the criminal dangerousness framework, and provide a glimpse 
into how the model of domestic criminal law can better inform and guide 
judicial review of detention in the War on Terror. Though that inquiry will 
at times be difficult, filled with the usual ambiguities and judgment calls 
that keep the law so interesting, “the fact that such a determination is 
difficult . . . does not mean that it cannot be made.”84 For the courts to play 
their constitutionally mandated role, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, a 
more rigorous review process should be embraced, one that requires a 
greater measure of proof on the part of the government in a manner more 
 
Hearsay, for example, may need to be accepted as the most reliable available evidence from the 
Government in such a proceeding.”). 
 83.  Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 13, at 2125. 
 84.  Jurek v. Texas, 428 US. 262, 274-75 (1976) (Stevens, J.) (plurality opinion). 
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closely aligned with our constitutional values. Incorporating a future 
dangerousness inquiry into habeas review is one potentially useful method 
for achieving that goal. 
 
